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TIWANAKU AND ADJACENT VALLEYS
aqueducts, primary canals and canalized springs, quebradas, and rivers (Ortloffand Kolata 1989) .
Comprehensive descriptions of Titicaca Basin raised-field morphology and structure can be found in Erickson (1988) and Lennon (1982 Lennon ( , 1983 ).
An essential property of the Lake Titicaca raised-field systems stabilized and enhanced their productivity and sustainability. Recent experimental work in restored Tiwanaku raised fields (described in greater detail below) indicates that the canals adjacent to the elevated planting surfaces were rapidly colonized by a diverse range of aquatic macrophytes, such as Azolla, Myriophyllum, and Elodea. These aquatic macrophytes trap suspended, water-borne particulates and thereby se- 
. These well-preserved Tiwanaku raised fields were reconstructed by Aymara from local communities around Lakaya between August and September 1987 and were planted in a variety of indigenous (principally potato) and introduced crops. Organic fertilizer in the form of green manure and animal waste (but no commercial fertilizer) was applied to the rehabilitated fields, and cultivation and weeding proceeded in a normal manner.
On the nights of February 28-29,1988, the Bolivian altiplano in the Pampa Koani region suffered a killing frost with temperatures in the Lakaya sector dropping to -5°C in some areas. Substantial zones of potato and quinoa cultivation on plains and hillslopes along the southern rim of Lake Titicaca were severely damaged by this heavy frost. Many traditional dry-farmed potato fields within a few hundred meters of the experimental raised-field plots experienced crop losses as high as 70-90 percent. One control plot cultivated in the traditional manner without benefit of raised-field technology lost every maturing potato plant. In contrast, losses in the experimental raised fields of Lakaya were limited to superficial frost damage of foliage on potato plants. Barley, broad beans, quinoa, caniwa, onions, and lettuce on the raised fields also exhibited only superficial damage and low loss rates from the frost. We attribute this substantial diffierential in plant survivability to the heat-storage properties of the saturated raised fields and their surrounding canals. In effect, these experiments demonstrate that Prehispanic systems of raised-field cultivation in the altiplano possess much higher thermal efficiency than traditional forms of dry farming practiced by the indigenous peoples of the area since the early Spanish Colonial period. Not surprisingly, given the high risk of crop loss through frost damage, the higher thermal efficiency of the raised fields, when combined with the forms of natural fertilization available to the raised-field cultivator, translates into substantially higher yield performance in comparison with dry farming.
In addition to demonstrating the superior thermal properties of raised fields, our experiments in rehabilitating Tiwanaku raised fields indicated substantial yield diffierentials between traditional, b To obtain average yield in kilograms per hectare in the raised-field system as a whole, rather than the platform surfaces alone, this figure must be halved to reflect the approximate proportion of noncultivated canal surfaces. E^ective yield per hectare becomes ca. 21 metric tons/hectare. dry farming and raised-field cultivation. Table 1 illustrates the yields of potato, the principal tuber planted in 12 individual control parcels in the reconstructed raised fields, along with supplemental data on the surface dimensions of the control parcels, number of planted furrows and individual plants per parcel, the achieved weight and number of tubers per potato plant, and the incidence of frost damage.
The yields from the experimental raised fields compare favorably with those obtained from control plots of two traditional variants of altiplano agriculture cultivated for purposes of direct comparison. The two traditional forllls of agricultural plots were: (1) shallow-furrow, seasonal rain-dependent plots, cultivated without the benefit of irrigation, or the use of chemical fertilizers or pesticides, but with small quantities of organic fertilizer, principally dried cattle manure, incorporated into the fields prior to seeding, and (2) shallow-furrow, dry-cultivated plots with added chemical fertilizers and pesticides applied both to the soil and to foliage throughout the growing season. The first control plot was established on a previously cultivated, gentle hillslope in the community of Lakaya approximately 120 m south of the reconstructed raised fields on the pampa (Figure 4) . The specific plot chosen for cultivation had been in fallow for about five years (the landowner was unable to provide a precise date for the last previous planting of the field, but he did mention that the last crop planted was barley). The second control plot was established in the community of Achuta Grande in the valley of Tiwanaku, 4 km west of the village of Tiwanaku. This plot was cultivated on long-fallowed, flat land near the Rio Tiwanaku, which had been used for the past 15 years exclusively for pasturage. This second control plot lies approximately 200 m southwest of 4 ha of rehabilitated raised fields in the Achuta Grande pampa.
The first form of traditional cultivation has been the dominant mode of peasant agricultural production in the Bolivian altiplano for nearly five centuries even though it is patently inefficient. As indicated by the yield and supplemental production data in Table 2 , this form of nonfertilized dry farming achieved an average of 2.5 metric tons (t)/ha of potato (the index plant of our experimental work) on five cultivated parcels. During the 1987-1988 growing season, 100 percent of the maturing plants on these parcels exhibited lesions from frost, with the bulk of the damage occurring during the hard freeze in February, 1988. Depending on the individual parcels of cultivated land, approximately 10-30 percent of these plants were superficially damaged by frost, but the remaining 70-90 percent were destroyed and yielded no edible tubers.
Predictably, the addition of commerical fertilizers (N, P, K: nitrogen, phosphorous, and potassium) on traditional fields (control plot 2) increased production substantially to an average of 14.5 t/ha on eight cultivated parcels (Table 3) . Despite the expected enhanced performance of traditional agricultural fields treated with commercial fertilizers, it is clear from a comparison of the data in Table 1 from statistics compiled by the Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture. These averages of regional potato production on traditionally cultivated plots range from 1.5 to 6 t/ha, which compares well with our own result of 2.4 t/ha. The higher average production figures for the Puno area (> 3 t/ha) probably reflect fields treated with natural or chemical fertilizers and should be compared with our result of 7.25 t/ha for improved traditional agriculture (Table 3 ). On raised fields that were not treated with fertilizers over a three-year production cycle, the Puno group generated an average of 10.65 t/ha with a range from 8.3 to 13.0 t/ha.
As can be seen in Table 4 , production figures varied considerably over time and space. Some areas did particularly well in a given year, and even within individual blocks of reclaimed raised fields there was considerable variability in yield depending on placement of seed in the center or along the edge of a cultivated plot (Erickson 1988), an experience replicated in our own work on the Bolivian side of the lake. The average yields of potato on raised fields achieved by the Puno group are lower than those obtained on the Bolivian side in the Pampa Koani region, although the pattern of dramatically enhanced production on raised fields in comparison to traditional fields is identical. The higher yields obtained on the Bolivian side may relate to slight climatic diffierences between the northern and southern sides of Lake Titicaca. The area around Puno is at a higher altitude and consequently is somewhat more prone to frost damage than the area of the Pampa Koani. Moreover, the planting and cultivating protocols practiced by the Puno group appear to have diffiered from our own. The Aymara villagers rehabilitating fields in the Pampa Koani routinely incorporated organic fertilizer (green manure, or animal waste) into the fields during field construction, tilling, and sowing activities.
Despite the diffierences in average raised-field potato production between the Puno and the Pampa Koani experiments, the general trend of significantly enhanced yields on reclaimed raised fields appears established beyond a reasonable doubt. At a minimum, cultivation on reclaimed raised fields results in production from two to three times greater than that obtained by traditional methods. Moreover, as Erickson (1988:245) points out, raised fields are remarkably efficient in terms of the ratio of seed to producing plant: "in comparison to traditional fields, only half the seed is necessary for planting a hectare of raised fields since half the area is uncultivated canal. [T]hese high production rates are even more impresssive when considering that a hectare of raised fields has only half the number of plants of a traditional potato field." If the experiments of both research groups are correct, raised fields represent a prime example of continuous, efficient, and potentially sustainable cultivation: a system of intensive hydraulic agriculture that required no extended periods of fallow.
But, these experimental results, however provocative, cannot be taken uncritically and at face value. They must be placed in a specific experimental and ecological context that explains at least part of the diffierence in performance between raised fields and traditional dry farming. In accounting Kolata] AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE TIWANAKU STATE 107 Tables 1-3 plus two additional cycles that have not yet been completely analyzed but which demonstrate similar yield results). Although the Peruvian results are based on additional production cycles, much longer periods of production comparison will be required to statistically confirm a sustained, superior performance of raised fields against traditional forms of agriculture.
Second, the experimental raised fields are constructed on land that has not been in intensive cultivation for over 800 years, and we might anticipate higher than average production in this exceptionally long-fallowed area. Moreover, land in this area of the altiplano has been given over to pasturage for sheep and cattle during the past century, resulting in increased nutrient inputs.
Even with these two caveats, the diffierences in yield are so dramatic that a significant, although unquantified, proportion of the yield diffierential between raised fields and traditional forms of agriculture must be attributed to the superior frost-mitigation attributes of the raised fields. If the heat-and nutrient-conservation effiects in raised fields described here are further verified, then our perception of the subsistence base of Tiwanaku civilization will be radically altered. If these assumptions and empirical observations are correct and replicable, we must consider the possibility that the physical and thermal properties of Tiwanaku raised-field agriculture in the circum-Titicaca Basin permitted a regime of double cropping of potato, ulluco, canEwa, quinoa, and other indigenous staples of the altiplano.
During the , but these are generally restricted in area and constrained severely by frost hazard. The experimental results from Lakaya constitute prima facie evidence for the feasibility of double cropping in the Pampa Koani region using raisedfield technology. However, the key issue of the sustainability of continuous double cropping in this area remains unresolved. Additional experimental production cycles, perhaps extending over two or more decades, will be required before this issue can be settled with a reasonable degree of confidence. Moreover, these results do not, in themselves, demonstrate that Tiwanaku farmers actually did double crop (like many propositions in archaeology, this is currently not directly demonstrable). But the preliminary results from Lakaya demonstrate that a double crop can be achieved using raised-field technology, and that the success of a double-cropping regime in this area is directly dependent upon a consistent, adequate water supply to the raised-field canals.
Continuous cultivation on fixed, permanent fields, short or no fallow periods, and two episodes of sowing and harvesting within the same agricultural year are inconceivable in the contemporary agrarian landscape of the high plateau. Yet these may have been standard features of Tiwanaku agricultural practice. If the farmers of Tiwanaku engaged in double cropping, the estimates of production on raised fields described here may be too conservative and may themselves require substantial upward revision for greater accuracy. The experimental and empirical evidence as it currently stands suggests that such a regime of agricultural intensification was a principal strategy of Tiwanaku agricultural production. This conclusion, in turn, brings us inevitably to a reconsideration of the possibilities and limits of surplus production in the heartland of the Tiwanaku state. Reconstructing these limits offers critical insights into the questions of demographic potential and the structure of local food supply in Tiwanaku's immediate hinterland.
Carrying Capacity, Population, and Food Supply
Perhaps the most perilous enterprise undertaken by archaeologists is that of estimating the population size of prehistoric cities and states and the functionally related concept of regional carrying capacity. By carrying capacity I mean the number and density of people that can be supported at a minimal subsistence level by the resources contained within a given area and with a given production technology. Even under the best of circumstances, population projections and calculations of prehistoric carrying capacity are fraught with uncertainty. Carrying capacity, in particular, is a slippery, highly context-specific concept, bound as much to the social world of cultural beliefs, values, and practice as to the physical world of natural resources. An accurate determination of carrying capacity would require detailed knowledge of what a given culture accepts as an exploitable natural resource, or as a desirable foodstuS. Few human societies were ever completely isolated in a cultural sense, or encapsulated within rigid physical boundaries, and so determining carrying capacity in its fullest sense also entails mapping out the net flow of goods and services into and out of the region of interest.
Given the elasticity and uncertainty of the concept, the estimates of carrying capacity generated here are intended solely as a projection of boundary conditions for population size. In other words, they are not realistic estimates of precise carrying capacity or population size for Tiwanaku and its near hinterland. However, the experiments in raised-field production provide us with an empirical tool for calculating the range of demographic possibilities in the Tiwanaku sustaining area.
The kilogram of potato developed for previous carrying-capacity estimates in the ecological context of the Andean highlands will be used. In accordance with these figures, a person on the high plateau requires a yearly minimum intake of approximately 533,000 calories, which can be extracted from 533 kg of potato. 3. Finally, since the objective is to establish boundary conditions, or general parameters of production and population in the Tiwanaku sustaining area, I make an initial assumption of successful utilization of 100 percent of the raised fields in the area to generate population-density estimates. Given potential effects of annual localized crop loss from hail, frost, pests, and spoilage, lake-level fluctuations that would have inundated and taken out of production local areas of raised fields, temporal variability in the use of fields under raised-field cultivation during the several hundred years of Tiwanaku occupation, and other such variables, this expectation is not entirely realistic. The variables that reduced gross production are not easily quantified. Therefore, to account for crop attrition, I will arbitrarily adjust for the cumulative effect of these loss variables by recalculating the population-density estimates a second time, assuming 75 percent utilization of the fields.
Given this set of assumptions, what sort of carrying capacity and population densities can be generated for the Tiwanaku region using the two experimentally determined raised-field production figures of 10.65 t/ha (the Peruvian group) and 21 t/ha (the Bolivian group)? If the average annual yield of potato per hectare is divided by the annual requirement of 533 kg of potato per capita, then 1 ha of raised fields planted in potato will support approximately 20 persons for one year according to the Peruvian experiment, and 39 persons per year according to the Bolivian experiment. Applying these figures to the 19,000 ha of preserved raised fields in the Tiwanaku sustaining area, the carrying capacity for the region ranges between 380,000 and 741,000, assuming a single annual crop and 100 percent utilization of the fields. If a regime of double cropping and 100 percent utilization is assumed, the population figures range between 760,000 and 1,482,000 (Table 5) . Recalculating these population figures by changing the assumed field utilization to 75 percent, population ranges of 285,000-555,750 result for a single annual crop, and 570,00O1,111,500 for a double crop (Table 6 ).
The two most probable ranges from these four sets of maximum supportable population are the options that assume 75 percent utilization of the fields. The rationale for choosing these ranges is straightforward. The farmers of Tiwanaku never simultaneously utilized or achieved productive harvests from 100 percent of the 19,000 ha of preserved raised fields, therefore some level of attrition Table 6 indicate that in Tiwanaku times the Pampa Koani region alone had the potential of supporting from 210,000 to 410,000 people on a sustained basis (again assuming the benchmark of double cropping and 75 percent field utilization). Even if we calculate carrying capacity using a single annual crop, the range of supportable population remains impressive: 105,000-205,000. Today, in the absence of raised-field technology, the carrying capacity of the Pampa Koani is enormously reduced, and the entire region supports only about 7,000 people at a level slightly beyond bare subsistence. Similar radical differences between past and present carrying capacity and absolute population levels can be demonstrated for the Tiwanaku Valley and the Machaca/Desaguadero area as well. 1991 Comparing the high population potentials generated by these calculations with actual population estimates for the Tiwanaku sustaining area during Tiwanaku IV and V times (ca. A.D. 400-1000), what conclusions may be drawn with respect to carrying capacity and the structure of food supply to urbanized populations? First, it is clear that, based on the component of agricultural production alone, the carrying capacity of the Tiwanaku metropolitan zone exceeded peak estimated population throughout the period from A.D.400 to 1000. That is, Tiwanaku core populations never approached an absolute level that was sufficient to put stress on the agricultural capacity to absorb and sustain demographic growth. Elsewhere, I have estimated overall peak population for the immediate Tiwanaku core area (the three-valley system of Pampa Koani-Tiwanaku-Machaca) during this period as approximately 365,000, distributed into a concentrated, urbanized component of some 115,000 and a dispersed rural component approaching 250,000 (Kolata 1989) . Taking into account other sources of food supply available to these populations, such as the enormous quantities of highquality meat stored on the hoof in llama herds or the rich aquatic resources of the lake-edge environment, it is even more apparent that Tiwanaku population levels never approached the calculated ceiling of population potential. Any plausible estimate of the carrying capacity in the three-valley system comes to the same conclusion. In Tiwanaku times, there was always a substantial margin of productivity that was never extracted from Tiwanaku's sustaining hinterland. In short, stress brought on by absolute population pressure against a fixed resource base never played a significant role in precipitating social change among the people of Tiwanaku.
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
We may conclude, then, with reasonable certainty that raised-field technology in combination with extensive herding and fishing activities formed the pivot of Tiwanaku's endogenous economy (Browman 1978 (Browman , 1981 First, we must recognize that these issues have an implied structure of space/time variability. Simply put, it is unlikely that a single configuration describes and explains the social organization of agricultural production as this was worked out once and for all by the people of Tiwanaku. The ways that arable land, labor, agricultural produce, and people were interrelated at the local level, and how these, in turn, formed a nexus with physically and socially distant political authorities constitute a series of shifting and evanescent patterns. We cannot expect or falsely create uniformity. There never was a once and for all. Rather we can conjecture with some confidence that there existed multiple structures of local organization revolving around the social, economic, and ritual acts of farming that were formed and reformed in the variegated textures of local history. By their nature as products of the interaction of people now long disappeared, the precise character and meaning of these organizational forms are forever lost to us. Yet, we know that certain social institutions, (Graffam 1990; Kolata 1986) . However, these ceramics were not recovered in direct associations with the raised fields themselves, and therefore cannot be used definitively to date the agricultural works. Nevertheless, given the pattern of early reclamation of land for agricultural purposes on the northern side of the lake, it is reasonable to assume that the lacustrine-oriented Chiripa and pre-Chiripa peoples of the southern side were engaged in similar efforts to enhance their productive base through intensive raised-field agriculture. How did these pioneering agriculturists of the high plateau organize the process of constructing and maintaining raised-field agriculture?
We can conjecture that the initial experimentation with raised-field agriculture involved relatively small groups of related families who developed and elaborated this technology of cultivation along the marshy shores of Lake Titicaca. The maximal unit of social organization of these early farmers was probably the ayllu, based territorially in small villages and hamlets (in the range of approximately 10 to a few hundred people). The effective unit of production within these ayllus was the individual household, minimally a married couple and dependent children, as it remains today in the rural reaches of the high plateau. In other words, the agriculturists who pioneered the raised-field system in the Titicaca Basin during the first millennium B.C. organized themselves as small, kin-based corporate groups. The clusters of related families were not differentiated sociologically beyond the level of the structural hierarchies embedded within the ayllu itself. These were quintessential prestate social formations that functioned by community consensus without political positions defined by ascribed statuses or the intervention of civil bureaucracies. The social landscape of these groups did not incorporate distinctions drawn across class lines, nor was there a complex structure of political command. However, this is not to say that the cultural universe of these kin-based corporate groups was primitive or parochial. Judging from contemporary ethnographic accounts from the altiplano, such rural ayllus enjoyed substantial communication and social exchange over considerable distance, and conceived of their interaction in terms of elaborate, cyclically expressed ritual actions grounded in a shared ideology (Abercrombie 1986; Bastien 1978).
Erickson (1988) has argued that such small corporate groups, organized along the lines of traditional Andean principles of kinship, were capable of constructing the immense configuration of raised fields in the Titicaca Basin. In essence, he speculates that this agricultural system was originated by, and remained the province of, a wetlands-adapted cluster of ethnic groups that he associates with the ethnohistorically documented Uru-and Pukina-speaking peoples. Erickson (1988:348) concludes that Andean raised-field agriculture was never under the direct control of centralized state governments: "[I]n the Lake Titicaca Basin, the raised fields were associated with relatively small cooperative groups, while the dominant political organization in the basin was at the level of a state. It is unlikely that this highly productive system which functioned efficiently under local management would have been tampered with by the state."
If we pose the question whether the enormous raised-field systems of the Titicaca Basin could have been constructed by relatively small corporate groups in a piecemeal fashion over long periods of time, the clear answer, drawn from the broadest cross-cultural perspective on analogous systems of hydraulic agriculture, is yes. The massive irrigated terrace systems of Sri Lanka described by Leach (1959) are a classic ethnographic example of this kind of gradual physical accretion of hydraulic works organized and constructed according to decentralized principles of local decision making. Similarly, Lansing (1987) provides a fascinating description of the organization of irrigation on rice terraces in Bali through a system of "water temples." In this system, a complex hierarchy of temples controls the schedule of water distribution by managing the performance of rituals perceived to be essential to the growth cycle of the rice plant. The temple hierarchy itself begins (or perhaps more aptly from the perspective of the productive cycle, ends) with small family shrines erected by each farmer at the distal points of the irrigation canals where water first flows into individual plots. Farther upstream, collectivities representing clusters of families organized into small irrigation communities (subaks) establish communal temples at the heads of field systems. Continuing up the hierarchy, Ulun Swi regional temples shared by a cluster of subaks were erected to manage water distribution and maintenance of the hydraulic system at the heads of terraces. Virtually every water source had a corresponding temple, and all temples were subordinated to and overseen by a supreme water temple. Temple priests were responsible for performing three tasks fundamental to successful operation of any regional irrigation system (Coward 1979 ): managing the allocation of water, organizing the physical maintenance of canals and terraces, and resolving conflicts among competing farmers. The priests of the water temple also were charged with authorizing new additions to the interlinked canal and terrace network.
The striking features of the Balinese water-temple system are its hierarchical design and its virtually complete disengagement from a strictly political form of organization. Each farmer is responsible for the maintenance of his portion of the irrigation canals up to his family's shrine. The subak is responsible for the maintenance of communal irrigation lines up to the Ulun Swi regional temple, and so on upstream in increasingly more inclusive social units to the supreme water temple. In this sense, there is no tightly centralized authority charged with construction and maintenance of this system. The inevitable conflicts over water rights were frequently resolved at lower levels of the temple hierarchy than at the symbolic apex represented by the supreme water temple and its coterie of priests. Furthermore, the procedure for allocating irrigation water among the subaks is the end product of intensely conservative, traditional decisions made locally. Accordingly, there is rarely any need to consult the temples for guidance because most aspects of water scheduling and sharing are routinized and anticipated as predictable events in the agricultural cycle. In short, the Balinese water-temple system represents one instance in which relatively complex networks of hydraulic structures were constructed and maintained by locally autonomous social groups that reinforced community cooperation through the working out of shared beliefs expressed publicly in the repetitive performance of agricultural rituals. In the Balinese case, religious ideology performs considerable social work, obviating the need for centralized or formal political forms of organization.
The Each layer in this social system, characterized by principles of duality and hierarchy, was governed not by a single soverign but by two political rulers, one of whom maintained a higher status than the other. This status distinction is reflected in the Spanish terms for these two kinds of local, indigenous lords: cacique or kuraka principal (paramount ruler) and segunda persona (lieutenant). Each of these pairs of local lords could call upon the subjects of their own group to perform labor related to agricultural production, such as canal construction and periodic cleaning. Moreover, each of these lords could also mobilize labor for tribute payments to paramount rulers of higher status in this nested hierarchy. Netherly (1984:233) concludes that this organizational structure was "infinitely subdivisible and could accomodate an extremely large population without reorganization," accordingly, "[T]here was no need for a large body of supervising bureaucrats to manage such labor."
As in the case of the Balinese water temples, this system maintained local autonomy and partitioned responsibility for labor among its constituent groups. Each cluster of farmers maintained the irrigation canals that fed their own land holdings. They also contributed labor for the upkeep of essential common elements ofthe system, such as principal water intakes and the maximum elevation The distribution and function of these settlements on the Pampa Koani implies that the labor to construct and maintain the extensive field systems must have been drawn from a wider, nonlocal region in a pattern attuned to the agricultural cycle of the seasons. This labor was most likely extracted by the centralized authorities of the Tiwanaku state in the form of corvee through a mechanism similar to the Inca mit'a labor-tax system. New evidence concerning the nature and regional function of massive public construction projects that were designed to promote large-scale reclamation and productivity of arable land on the Koani plain and in the valley of Tiwanaku reinforces these conclusions and points to a managerial hand beyond that of locally autonomous village or ayllu groupings.
For instance, Figure 4 illustrates two kinds of public construction projects on the Koani plain that served functions related to the operation of raised fields, not as bounded, independent bundles of field plots, but as interdependent regional system of production. The first of these public constructions is a network of elevated causeways and dikes. The principal route of the largest elevated roadbed, the trans-pampa causeway, together with its major branch connected the marshy, lowlying zone of raised fields in the western end of the Pampa Koani with roads running along mountain terraces forming the northern and southern boundaries of the pampa, respectively. These contour roads running along the base of the mountain slopes lead directly to the important regional Tiwanaku urban settlements of Lukurmata and Pajchiri, as well as to the smaller towns of Yayes and Lakaya (Figures 1 and 4) . The trans-pampa causeway itself was possibly paved with cut stone in its southern extremity as it approached Lakaya. Several smaller elevated roadbeds radiate out laterally from the trans-pampa causeway to articulate field segments with the larger platform mounds in the central ritual and administrative settlement cluster. The formal causeways on the Pampa Koani were designed to facilitate travel and presumably the transport of agricultural goods from the production zone to consuming and processing centers of population. Transport of bulk produce along the causeway and road network was most likely facilitated by organized packtrains of llamas.
The The Tiwanaku Valley canal (which we have designated by the local Aymara term Wana Jawira) illustrates a sophisticated principle of Tiwanaku regional hydraulic engineering: designed multifunctionality. The canal, together with its shunt system, was capable of implementing either a waterdistribution or a water-extraction strategy. That is, in the dry season, or in times of drought, the canal was capable of carrying river water from its intake on the Rio Tiwanaku to secondary canals downstream, for distribution to adjacent raised-field complexes (Figures 6 and 7) . During the rainy season, or in an inundation event, the intakes of the secondary distribution canals could have been blocked with some form of formal or informal sluice gates and excess river flow extracted and redirected away from the downstream agricultural landscape. In the case of the Wana Jawira, the principal canal rejoins the Rio Tiwanaku at a point some 4 km downstream from its intake. Interestingly, there appears to be evidence from aerial photographs of a "second loop" to the Wana Jawira system that takes off from the Rio Tiwanaku immediately west of the point at which the first section of the canal rejoins the river; this segment of the canal eventually terminates at the shoreline of Lake Titicaca. However, this presumed second loop is inadequately investigated, and we cannot yet confirm that it is an artificial feature, rather than, for instance, an ancient river meander.
Designed multifunctionality of hydraulic structures integrated into a regional regime of water control was clearly a key empirical principle in the organization of Tiwanaku agricultural production and not an aberrant or unique occurrence. If the latter were the case, one could argue, as Netherly (1984) does for the Chimu Moche-Chicama intervalley canal, that the state only rarely invested in capital-and labor-intensive projects to enhance agricultural production, preferring a laissez-faire approach to managing its agrarian affairs. However, repeated and consistent occurrence of major Tiwanaku hydraulic structures in both rural and urban zones vitiates application of the laissez-faire hypothesis to the Tiwanaku system. Recent investigations at Lukurmata and Pajchiri resulted in discovery and detailed analysis of aqueducts: the first open-channel, surface-water transport structures to be definitively associated raised-field systems directly implies the action of a regional political authority. The conjoined data from the spatial and temporal distribution of settlements and field systems, from broad demographic patterns (as these can currently be reconstituted), estimates of labor input and caloric yields, and the technological profile of the interconnected aqueduct-reservoir-canal-causeway-field systems in the northern Tiwanaku sustaining area, implicate some forms of extractive and channelizing functions performed beyond the purview of local community leaders or political elites. Although the initial, pioneering construction of raised-field plots was most likely the product of an autonomous, uncentralized social order, the subsequent reshaping of the Koani plain into a regional system of agricultural production under the hegemony of Tiwanaku elites in the period from ca. A.D. 400 to 1000 entailed the periodic mobilization and coordination of a substantial nonresident labor force. The logistic requirements of repeatedly organizing the deployment of a concentrated, nonlocal labor force demanded a political order with powerful regional authority to alienate land and co-opt labor, and at least a rudimentary bureaucratic system to track the extraction of labor service from subject communities and the subsequent flow of produce from state-operated fields.
This interpretation of the organizational framework of production in the Koani zone implies that Tiwanaku established proprietary agricultural estates in which ownership and usufruct rights were vested directly in state institutions, or perhaps more precisely in the hands of the elite, dominant classes. These corporate estates or production zones were bound directly to the capital of Tiwanaku through a network of secondary and tertiary urban, or urbanized formations with administrative functions. Dispersed, rural hamlets and individual households occur in the Tiwanaku area outside the zone of optimal lacustrine agricultural soils. These settlements were probably engaged in smallscale subsistence dry farming and "tethered" herding of camelids, and undoubtedly, along with the commoner populations ofthe larger secondary and tertiary centers, provided a substantial proportion of the corvee, or perhaps more properly, mit'a labor for the state fields. The population in this sustaining area was not distributed uniformly or broadly across the landscape. Rather, a pattern of nodal population clustering has been documented in large urban centers such as Lukurmata and Pajchiri, and in intermediate-scale settlements such as Chiripa, Chojasivi, Lakaya, and Yayes, arrayed along the combined geological and human-altered terraces that define the northern and southern borders ofthe Koani plain (Figure 4) . The regionally integrated agricultural field systems in this same zone were constructed and maintained during the Tiwanaku III through Tiwanaku V phases (ca. A.D. 300-1000). During Tiwanaku phases IV and V these field systems achieved their maximum spatial reach. The most technologically advanced manipulation of the reclaimed landscape of raised fields in this area, represented by the construction of interconnected spring, reservoir, and aqueduct water-delivery systems was associated with these same two periods of Tiwanaku internal development (Kolata and OrtloS 1989; OrtloS and Kolata 1989) . If local lords, as political leaders of ranked, hierarchically nested corporate groups, were responsible for creating the agricultural landscape of Tiwanaku's northern sustaining area without the control functions of a centralized state bureaucracy, the settlement pattern of the region would look quite diffierent than it actually does. For instance, we would anticipate that relatively substantial settlements would be established at, or associated with, key "break points" in the delivery system that provided fresh water to the raised-field networks. Such strategic break points would include the intakes of principal canals, the origin points of abundant mountain springs that issue from the surrounding terraces of the Lakaya geological formation, or the geographically dispersed, but agriculturally critical zones of high groundwater characteristic of that formation. In short, the politico-administrative and settlement landscape in the Koani zone would reflect a configuration closer to that hypothesized by Netherly (1984) for the late Prehispanic north coast of Peru, in which autonomous sociopolitical groups (parcialidades) were arrayed along lands watered by individual canals, or segments of canals. Given the marked absence of substantial habitation centers with the raised-field-canal-causeway system of the Koani zone, and the complete lack of evidence for local control over, or population clustering in strategic areas of structural articulation within the hydraulic system as a whole, there remains little alternative but to consider the organization of Tiwanaku's northern sustaining area as reflecting state action at a distance. It is premature at present to extend this analysis to the Tiwanaku Valley and Machaca zones. Ongoing research will eventually determine if a similar pattern of centralized extraction apparent in the Koani zone holds for the central and southern sustaining area of Tiwanaku, or if, in these zones, there was a diffierent system of organizing agricultural production. Nevertheless, initial results from intensive survey in the Tiwanaku Valley suggest that, as in the Koani region, agricultural production in this valley during the Tiwanaku IV-V phases was also organized and managed hierarchically (Albarracin-Jordan 1990; Albarracin-Jordan and Mathews 1990; Mathews 1990) .
It may well be that some form of organization similar to the recursive, hierarchically ranked sets of moieties that Netherly (1984:230) envisions as the fundamental armature for the management of large-scale irrigation systems on Peru's north coast played a role in the development of Tiwanaku's agricultural sustaining area. But, the principles governing mobilization and control of human labor must have been rather diffierent from the relative local autonomy at the level of the parcialidades implied in Netherly's treatment of the north-coast material. In straightforward terms, the data from the Koani region implicate a pattern of purposive state development of a distinct, integrated, rural agricultural-production zone. The organization of production in this zone was achieved by centralized state action that entailed the presence of strategically located installations not under the control of local corporate groups. In great part, the labor to construct and maintain these installations was similarly nonlocal, mobilized from a region much broader than that encompassed by the field systems themselves. By about A.D. 500 (the Tiwanaku IV phase), the Pampa Koani hinterland can best be understood as a constructed landscape of state production. The labor invested in shaping that landscape may have been drawn from taxation of both local and nonlocal corporate groups headed by ranked political leaders who acted as intermediaries and surrogates for the Tiwanaku political elite. But, given what is known of the settlement distribution in the Koani region, the autonomy of these local kurakas must have been constrained by the needs and the prerogatives of the more highly ranked nonlocal elites who resided in the network of urban centers in the greater Tiwanaku sustaining area.
I would argue that the paramount elites of Tiwanaku operated with fluid, context-specific strategies of economic development. On the one hand, the group or perhaps class interests of these elites demanded the creation of strategic, directly controlled production zones that ensured long-term stability in access to surplus crops and commodities. Investment in landscape capital (terrace and irrigation systems, aqueducts, and dikes) that served the purpose of expanding or stabilizing regional agricultural production goes hand in glove with this strategy of direct elite (state) intervention. Economic surplus generated from these intensification projects, of course, was the pediment of their political power. It furnished them with the means to sustain personal and group prestige through dynamic public expressions of generosity and abundance during the cyclical calendar of agricultural festivals and ritual events. The opulent lifestyle permitted to them by this surplus product was a kind of essential social theater that tangibly ratified their personal and positional status within Tiwanaku society.
At the same time that social and ideological necessity demanded that Tiwanaku elites carve out corporate estates to ensure a direct supply of agricultural production, political reality dictated that their relationships with most local communities and ethnic groups under their, at times, uncertain dominion follow the path of least resistance. That is, in most instances coercion of local populations and mass alienation of land and labor was not a viable political option for the Tiwanaku elites. The political and logistical costs entailed in dominating a huge, diverse physical territory were too great to sustain, and local resistance to the complete encroachment of an authoritarian regime was too much of a present threat to the social order to justify a posture of unalloyed hostility. Instead, Tiwanaku elites, much like their Inca counterparts some 700 years later, struck a balance between force and persuasion. They established, quite likely with ruthless efficiency, key proprietary estates of production that assured them of a stable fund of product that could be invested in sustaining the social roles demanded of them. At the same time, outside of these core areas of directly controlled production they moved by indirection and subtle attention to the local political context. In the latter circumstance, tributary relationships between the cosmopolitan elites of Tiwanaku and their distant rural counterparts were most likely framed in terms of patron/client exchanges. Such clientage relationships, in which the state confirmed the traditional authority of local kurakas in dealing with their own communities, were strategic elements of Inca statecraft, reflecting the remarkable shrewdness and political pragmatism of native Andean elites. 
